

gram for the visit of William Howard Taft, Petersburg, May 19, 1909.

14. Frederick S. Dunn, *Peaceful Change* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937), p. 13.

15. Richard Cobden, esp. *Speeches on Peace, Financial Reform, Colonial Reform and Other Subjects Delivered during 1849* (London: James Gilbert, n.d.), p. 135.

16. Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. G.D.H. Cole, Everyman's Library Edition (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1950); see esp. *Inequality*, pp. 234 ff.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

18. Benedict de Spinoza, *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), *Ethics*, pt. 4, prop. 35, proof.

19. Rousseau, *Social Contract and Discourses*, pp. 135-36 (bk. 4, chap. 8), italics added. The word "equally" is necessary for an accurate rendering of the French text but does not appear in the translation cited.

20. Jean Jacques Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe and the State of War*, trans. C. E. Vaughan (London: Constable and Co., 1917), p. 72.

21. This parallels Hegel's formulation: "It is to what is by nature accidental that accidents happen, and the fate whereby they happen is thus a necessity" (G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942], sec. 324).

22. Kant is more willing to admit the force of this criticism than is generally realized.

23. This is not, of course, to say that no differences in state behavior follow from the different constitutions and situations of states. This point raises the question of the relation of the third image to the second, which will be discussed below.

24. Rousseau, *Social Contract and Discourses*, pp. 290-91.

25. Rousseau, *A Lasting Peace*, pp. 46-48, 58-59.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 46-47. On p. 121, Rousseau distinguishes between the "state of war," which always exists among states, and war proper, which manifests itself in the settled intention to destroy the enemy state.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

28. In *ibid.*, p. 69, Rousseau presents his exhaustive list of such causes.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

31. Cf. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 158-59; and William Esslinger, *Politics and Science* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), *passim*.

32. Richard Cobden, *Speeches on Questions of Public Policy*, 2 vols., ed. John Bright and James E. Thorold Rogers (London: Macmillan & Co., 1870), 2: 165.

33. A. A. Milne, *Peace and War* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1934), p. 11.

34. Edward Grey, *Twenty-Five Years*, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), 2: 285.

35. Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1914*, 4 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923-29), 1: 52.

36. "Excerpts from Dulles Address on Peace," Washington, D.C., Apr. 11, 1955, in *New York Times*, Apr. 12, 1955, p. 6.

37. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist* (New York: Modern Library, 1941), pp. 23-24 (no. 5).

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28 (no. 6); cf. p. 18 (no. 4, Jay) and pp. 34-40 (no. 7, Hamilton).

DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY

CHARLES F. HERMANN

The previous essay was concerned with the causes of war and its persistence in interstate relations. Is war the only threat to national security? Perhaps we need to ask some important prior questions: What is national security? Are the dimensions and implications of national security changing? Charles Hermann, director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, addresses these important questions. He maintains that the apparent academic exercise of defining national security is not without practical implications. He identifies five broad aspects of the national security setting that have been changing and will continue to change in the years ahead: preferred value outcomes, the international environment, the domestic environment, the nature of threats, and strategies for threat aversion. In reading this essay, indeed in reading further in this book, the reader should be sensitive to how the constantly changing context of national security affairs affects the relevance of each article.

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Consider the ranged statements

"National security is defined as the ability to protect internal values from external threats" (Cobden and Bock, 1965)

"We are not to use these words; they are lost in a semantic game that comes to identify international phenomena with military hardware" (p. 150).

"Security means a condition which states preserve, in order to prevent the internal threats of their own states"

"Most Americans regard national security as do with the military. It is a military endeavor, primarily of the past ambiguity of the spectrum of threats to recognize that we must embrace or otherwise, interests, or sufficient national security to ample protection of our values, wherever they are and nonmilitary for the purpose of the power" (Taylor)

It is a reasonable to say that the national security concept is not universal, and that the definition of national security by the authors of the course on national security in American national security appear to suggest that. In his seminal work, Wolfers noted that such as 'national security' gain popularity through particular care in something to differentiate precise meanings. Wolfers sought to clarify often was an "he thought the clarity. This essay exists a core definition though not always is changing and context in which national security textual terms and constructs, it also

Consider the following chronologically arranged statements about national security:

"National security can be most fruitfully defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats" (Berkowitz and Bock, 1965, p. x).

"We are not playing a semantic game with these words; the trouble is that we have been lost in a semantic jungle for too long and have come to identify security with exclusively military phenomena and most particularly with military hardware. It just isn't so" (McNamara, 1968, p. 150).

"Security may be defined as a protective condition which statesmen either try to acquire, or preserve, in order to guard the various components of their polities from either external or internal threats" (Cohen and Tuttle, 1972, p. 1).

"Most Americans have been accustomed to regard national security as something having to do with the military defense of the country against a military enemy, and this as a responsibility primarily of the armed forces. . . . To remove past ambiguities and recognize the widened spectrum of threats to our security, we should recognize that adequate protection in the future must embrace all important valuables, tangible or otherwise, in the form of assets, national interests, or sources of future strength. . . . An adequate national security policy must provide ample protection for the foregoing classes of valuables, wherever found, from dangers military and nonmilitary, foreign and domestic, utilizing for the purpose all appropriate forms of national power" (Taylor, 1976, pp. 3-4).

It is a reasonable conjecture that when Berkowitz and Bock (1965) wrote their definition of national security it would have received wide, if not universal, acceptance by scholars and practitioners in the field. Subsequent observations by the authors of a model syllabus for a college course on national security and by two prominent American national security policy-makers would appear to suggest possible flux in the definition. In his seminal essay on national security, Arnold Wolfers noted in 1952: "When political formulas such as 'national interest' or 'national security' gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at all" (Wolfers, 1973, p. 42). Wolfers sought to explain why national security often was an "ambiguous symbol" even though he thought the concept capable of substantial clarity. This essay takes a similar position. There exists a core definition of national security that, though not always used, is little changed. What is changing and will continue to change is the context in which that concept is applied. If the national security is defined in momentary contextual terms rather than with respect to basic constructs, it also will appear to change.

Wolfers stated as his initial working definition that "security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired" (1973, p. 44). That serves equally well in the present note as a provisional definition although, like Wolfers, we will want to cast it somewhat differently and more formally when its ramifications have been explored.

The first thing that becomes apparent is that security is a value and normally serves as an instrumental value, i.e., one desires security in order to enjoy the products or outcomes of some other value(s). Occasionally, individuals or groups act as though security were an ultimate value, but even then they appear to be advocating security in order to protect something else—the physical survival of themselves or of some collectivity (see Smoke's [1975, p. 247] reference to "the protection of citizens' physical security").

Security also is a variable since one may have varying degrees of security. Some individuals, groups, or nations may be more secure than others for a variety of reasons and at the same time. The degree of danger or threat may vary; the number of values to be protected may differ; and psychological states and expectations about the future may not be comparable.

The reference to expectations introduces the need for an important departure from Wolfers's (1973, p. 44) provisional definition. Security concerns not only the protection of "values previously acquired," but also expectations about the future and the value outcomes to be experienced at a later time. Thus, security concerns not only the avoidance of loss, but also the prevention of blocked gain. Home insurance with increased coverage for the future appreciation of the residence is an example at the individual level of this dimension of security. As Lasswell and Kaplan (1950, p. 61) observed: "Security is high value expectancy, position, and potential: realistic expectancy of maintaining influence." Too often we associate security with existing conditions and with the status quo and thus overlook the important dynamic quality of this value.

Finally, security involves the minimization of danger or threat. Threat can be viewed as the anticipated obstruction of some value. When we speak of protection, we are talking about freedom from any obstruction or obstacle to our enjoyment of the value outcomes we hold in high regard.

Security can now be defined more formally as the expectation of retaining and enhancing the ability to partake of highly regarded value outcomes free of obstructions. National security thus becomes security with respect to "value outcomes" desired by those who comprise the effective political base of a nation. Such values have often been associated with the concept of national interests—another loosely-used term whose meaning we need not address here.

Contract and Discourses, pp.

ing Peace, pp. 46-48, 58-59.
47. On p. 121, Rousseau dis-
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No one should be led to believe that the apparent academic exercise of definition is not without practical implications. The proposed definition of national security (which is hardly novel) can be applied to the world of 1947, 1977, or 2007. But the phenomena associated with national security requirements will be different because of the changing context. With reference to the United States, we can identify five broad aspects of the national security setting that have been changing and that will continue to change.

1. *Preferred value outcomes.* The values that citizens of the United States hold most dear and the priorities assigned to them are not static. For example, concern with human rights is not new to many Americans but the prominence and universal application in the utterances and actions of American policy-makers is noteworthy. Thus, in the Helsinki accords on European security the United States and its European allies entered into agreements they resisted in earlier years in exchange for pledges of greater commitment to human rights values. The physical survival of the United States and of its institutions and territory would appear to be continuing core values. But, even here, changes are possible, as represented by the shifts in policy toward the expropriation of American private property overseas or the debate on the future of the Panama Canal. Clearly, as changes occur in the society's core values that we seek to promote and protect, the national security context will also change.

2. *International environment.* Any observer of the contemporary international scene who possesses some historical perspective recognizes that the world outside the political jurisdiction of the United States is undergoing profound changes. For example, the increasing role played by various nonterritorial actors such as ITT, Unilever, and other multinational corporations, or by the PLO and OPEC, are forging a new conceptualization of world politics. The growing economic interdependence between the United States and a number of other nations is another illustration with direct implications for American security. Can the United States be secure when there is a severe threat to Japan or Western Europe, whether that threat be military or fiscal? McNamara (1968, p. 149) would extend the interdependence argument further: "The irreducible fact remains that our security is related directly to the security of the newly developing world." The question arises as to the conditions under which security is divisible. Can there be a high degree of security under foreseeable circumstances? "There is a growing realization that in the modern world any increase in the security of one nation may depend on an increase in the security of other nations and that the concept of international security may become as meaningful as that of national security" (Berkowitz and Bock, 1968, p. 44).

3. *Domestic environment.* What is threatening to a weak, unprepared society will be less threatening (or even nonthreatening) to a strong, prepared one. The same concern manifests itself in the recent analysis of General Maxwell Taylor (1976, p. 128): "Many examples have been cited of internal weakness and tendencies which sap our strength and diminish the resources available to assure our security. Some have been individual traits of character; others are collective attitudes and predilections; not a few suggest a general aimlessness of national purpose. . . . While decay is not necessarily a form of self-destruction, we have other proclivities that clearly are—wastefulness, for example." As Taylor reminds us, a variety of domestic factors can have a profound and direct effect on the capability to cope with threats to core values. The familiar but disturbing litany of urban decay, racial strife, poor quality of education, energy shortages, inflation and unemployment, and ecological disruptions can each affect national security in multiple ways. First, they can erode both the ability and the will to address still other threats. Second, they pose the critical problem of tradeoffs. Resources expended to provide security from other threats—for example, external military dangers—reduce the resources available to cope with these problems which may not only lead to the loss of some of the very core values we sought to protect but also result in a reduction of our security as defined.

4. *Nature of threats.* Nowhere is the context for national security more in need of constant reappraisal than with respect to the nature and reality of the potential obstacles to our values. In the face of protracted stalemate, the strategic and conventional military threats may appear to dissipate of their own accord, thereby yielding a false sense of security. The new tanks in Eastern Europe, the volatile nature of the Middle East and southern Africa—to name a few—should underscore the continuing dynamics and danger posed by worldwide military developments. The quotations by McNamara and Taylor at the beginning of this essay, however, dramatize the need for equal vigilance with respect to unconventional hostilities (e.g., terrorism) and to those that fall completely outside the realm of military threats. Because the United States has for three decades been confronting the military threats associated with the Cold War, there is a clear possibility that our sensitivity to new sources of danger may have diminished. In this context, as an illustration, it is noteworthy that the United States National Security Council has considered the issue of world population growth as a problem posing a potential threat to the security of the United States.

5. *Strategies for threat aversion.* Shifts in values, environment, capabilities, or threats may lead to the need for altered strategies for mini-

mizing the threat. Strategic deterrence is a commonplace concept that has appealed to the United States and its allies for decades. It is a concept of strategic deterrence that has been applied to its allies and to the world at large. The question can be asked whether the United States has practiced strategic deterrence. Wolfers (1973, p. 10) generally: "If we use the term at least to mean the presence or absence of a credible threat to the security of others, the answer is yes, and the answer is yes to whom the threat is directed. Such a threat is beyond the realm of strategic deterrence seeking to bring about a change in behavior that do not lie beyond the realm of strategic deterrence and least costly. The concept of strategic deterrence is a concept of national security that involves the reduction of the opportunity for military intentions." The concept of strategic deterrence involving military and nonmilitary intentions is a concept of balanced national security.

It is essential to the concept of national security that dimensions like the nature of the threat, the nature of the threat comes, international environment, national security, and threat aversion.

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In this study, the threats to national security and economic development of the world are examined. It is necessary to direct attention to the threats to national security and economic development of the world.

The term "national security" is a commonplace concept that has appealed to the United States and its allies for decades. It is a concept of strategic deterrence that has been applied to its allies and to the world at large. The question can be asked whether the United States has practiced strategic deterrence.

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mizing the threats posed to our security. Strategic deterrence offers a case in point. For decades the United States has relied on various forms of strategic deterrence to protect itself and some of its allies against a nuclear attack. Yet, the question can be raised whether deterrence as we have practiced it can continue to offer a satisfactory shield against nuclear war (see Iklé, 1973). Wolfers (1973, p. 50) addresses the issue more generally: "If security, in the objective sense of the term at least, rises and falls with the presence or absence of aggressive intentions on the part of others, the attitude and behavior of those from whom the threat emanates are of prime importance. Such attitude and behavior need not be beyond the realm of influence by the country seeking to bolster its security. Whenever they do not lie beyond this realm, the most effective and least costly security policy consists in inducing the opponent to give up his aggressive intentions." Thus, a variety of strategies—some involving military coercion, others involving nonmilitary inducements—may all be part of a balanced national security policy.

It is essential to distinguish between the basic concept of national security and contextual dimensions like the preferred national value outcomes, international environment, domestic environment, nature of threats, and strategies for threat aversion. We need to monitor and to be

sensitive to the dynamics of the context even as we retain a basic commitment to a relatively clear and stable concept of national security.

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AN UNTRADITIONAL VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY

LESTER R. BROWN

In this short piece, Lester Brown argues that in addition to the traditional military threats to national security, there are numerous new threats against which traditional national defense establishments are useless. These new threats are essentially ecological and economic in origin and pose serious national security problems for the nations of the world. Although this book concentrates on the military threat to national security, it is necessary to be aware of nonmilitary threats to national well-being. Lester Brown is director of Worldwatch Institute, Washington, D.C.

The term "national security" has become a commonplace expression, a concept regularly appealed to. It is used to justify the maintenance of armies, the development of new weapons systems, and the manufacture of armaments. A fourth of all the federal taxes in the United States and

at least an equivalent amount in the Soviet Union are levied in its name.¹

The concern for the security of a nation is undoubtedly as old as the nation state itself, but since World War II the concept of "national security" has acquired an overwhelmingly military

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